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ABSTRACT

The paper discusses Lenin's attempts to alleviate discrepancies between Marxist philosophy and his own personal activist creed by, first, introducing Hegelian logic into dialectical materialism and, second, by creating an ideology of organizational activity. Lenin the man is examined in order to understand his interpretation of Marx and the gap between Marxism and activism. Through the reflection theory in his "Materialism and Empirio-criticism," Lenin's definition of matter and dialectical thoughts on knowledge (truth) and objective reality are assessed. His activist creed is developed with his attempt to resurrect subjective man combined with the objective process of attaining knowledge. The combination of materialistic epistemology and Hegelian logic to subjectivize man is noted in his "Philosophical Notebooks." Lenin's views on the Communist Party's leading role, active foreign intervention, and revolutionary war are probed. The conclusion presents the contention that there remains a determinism/voluntary action contradiction and a resulting dissatisfaction with Lenin's attempts to bridge these different perspectives. A short reference list is included. (TRS)

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"Lenin: An Activist Burdened by a Passivist Philosophy"

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Lenin: An Activist Burdened by a Passivist Philosophy

Lenin "thought he had found in Marxism both a guarantee of revolutionary success and an activist creed.... He desired to hold both ideas, and hence blinded himself to the contradiction between determinism and voluntary action" (Wolfenstein, 1967, pp. 176-177). Lenin attempted to alleviate discrepancies between Marxist philosophy and his own personal activist creed by first, creating an ideology of organizational activity (Wolfenstein, 1967, p. 177), and secondly, by introducing Hegelian logic into Dialectical Materialism (Ballestrem, 1965, pp. 139-141; see Lenin, 1961, pp. 187-189, 204-208).

In order to understand Lenin's interpretation of Marx and his struggles of bridging the gap between Marxism and activism, it is first necessary to look at Lenin, the man.

Lenin was born Vladimir Ilich Ulyanov on April 10, 1870. His family was of the intellectual middle class and was of German origin. As a child, he was an avid reader and excelled in school (Fischer, 1964, pp. 1-22). Wolfenstein in his psychoanalytic work, The Revolutionary Personality, describes Lenin as a man who was distrustful of others from an early age, a man who was pessimistic and trusted only his own work and his own sense of right and wrong (1967, pp. 303-304). During his early adolescent years, he lost both his father and his brother. Many researchers see these two events as having a determining influence on Lenin's life (Fischer, 1964; Morgan, 1971; Shub, 1948; Wolfenstein, 1967). Wolfenstein writes: "In Lenin's case the successive deaths of his father and his brother, the latter indirectly at the hands of the Tsar, created a great burden of guilt--and at the same time a way out from under the load" (1967, p. 306). In this same vein, Wolfenstein continues, "The death of his brother as the result of a revolutionary action provided both a partial model for political action and the enemy against whom Lenin was to fight" (1967, p. 308).

After graduation from the Simbirsk gymnasium, he entered Karzan University. There he was exposed to such writers as: Belinskikj, Černyševskij, Nečaev, Tkačev, Ogarev, and Marx (Bocheński, 1961 , p. 6). However, while at Karzan, he became involved in political activity which led to his expulsion. He later studied law on his own and was admitted to the bar in 1892 (see Fischer, 1964, pp. 18-19).

Lenin's membership in the socialist circles began during this troubled time of his life. He was arrested and exiled to Siberia for his revolutionary activity in 1895. He was freed in 1900, and through his popular writings and lectures, he became one of the leaders of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party. And in 1900, Lenin and Plekhanov began to edit Iskra (The Spark), a Social-Democratic paper, in Munich. The paper was smuggled back into Russia, and it became quite popular among middle class intellectuals and workers (see Fischer, 1964; Ulam, 1974).

In 1902, Lenin wrote the pamphlet "What is to be done?". This work was the beginning of Lenin's activist interpretations of Marx. He was dissatisfied with the passivism developing in the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party. And in 1903, he led the radical, activist faction of the party, the Bolsheviks against the moderate Mensheviks (Ulam, 1974, pp. 22-25).

Lenin returned to Russia in 1905 and attempted to lead an armed revolt in Moscow in December. However, the revolt failed, and he fled for western Europe. There he joined the Second International, a world-wide Socialist organization. When in March, 1917, Lenin heard of the downfall of the Tsar, he was in exile in Switzerland. He returned to Russia and urged the Bolsheviks to bring down the provisional government. And in November, 1917, the Bolsheviks succeeded (Ulam, 1974, pp. 24-34). Lenin was in charge.

Thus, "his life became the history of the Bolshevik movement....What

had theretofore been a lonely exile's polemics then became a great power's policies" (Fischer, 1964, p. 22). He was the "founder of the Soviet State and the father of Soviet politics" (Fischer, 1964, p. 1). He died childless on January 21, 1924; however, he died "leaving many ideological heirs and millions of political offspring throughout the world" (Fischer, 1964, p. 1).

Lenin was the interpreter of Marx for the Soviet people. His "conviction which he conveyed to others just because he felt it so deeply and could act upon it with the sure and natural movements of a man apparently born well to authority, that he, and at times he alone, correctly read Marx, that the question of his leadership was not one of personal volition or ambition but of the necessity for all men to recognize the truth, the Marxist truth which it was given to him to understand" (Wolfenstein, 1967, p. 28) was of paramount importance in his development of Marxist philosophy.

"It was Engels who explicitly and at great length explored and stated the fundamental question of all philosophy as the relation of mind and matter, thinking and being, consciousness and reality" (Kovaly, 1971, p. 279). "The fundamental question of philosophy and the answer to it forms...the foundations of the theory of knowledge. In Marxist philosophy, man's cognition has been for a long time explained by the theory of reflection" (Kovaly, 1971, p. 279). Its beginnings are said to be traceable in Marx and in Engels's interpretation of Marx, but it has been Lenin's Materialism and Empirio-Criticism which has been accepted as the classic formulation of the reflection theory (see Kovaly, 1971; Hogan, 1967). Materialism and Empirio-Criticism was published in 1908 "as a refutation of certain Russian Marxists who thought that Marxism could be combined with the epistemology of Ernst Mach" (Hogan, 1967, p. 297).

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Simply put, Lenin's theory of reflection states:

(1) a world exists 'independent' of and 'external' to consciousness, and

(2) knowledge consists of approximately faithful "reflections' of the world in consciousness. (Hogan, 1967, p. 297)

"Because the theory of reflection became the basis of the entire Marxist theory of knowledge, truth is also explained as a reflection" (Kovaly, 1971, p. 279).

The theory of reflection as discussed in Materialism and Empirio-criticism "leads to the conception of man as a rather passive resultant of external impulses" (Kovaly, 1971, p. 280). This troubled the activist Lenin, and he struggled with this problem in his later years. He expanded his theory of reflection by adapting Hegel's logic in his Philosophical Notebooks, Filosofskie tetradi (see Ballestrem, 1965, pp. 140-141; Hogan, 1967, p. 297). This was an attempt to introduce the subjectivity of man and the possibility of an activist man. In order to examine the evolution of his thinking, it is necessary first to examine his thoughts in Materialism and Empirio-criticism.

Perhaps one of the most often quoted passages from Materialism and Empirio-criticism is Lenin's definition of matter. He wrote: "Matter is a philosophical category designating the objective reality which is given to man by his sensations, and which is copied, photographed and reflected by our sensations, while existing independently of them" (1927, p.128). He states the materialist perspective: "Materialism, in full agreement with natural science, takes matter as primary and regards consciousness, thought and sensation as secondary, because in its well-defined form sensation is associated only with the higher forms of matter...." (1927, p. 38). Lenin suggests that sensations are images (Gedankenabbilder) or rather reflections of things. And that in order to understand human knowledge, we must start with the provoker of these reflections, matter. He believed that man

must understand knowledge by examining it from the perspective of things (matter)--to--sensations (reflections of things)--to--thoughts (internal reflections of things) (see Lenin, 1927, pp. 33-34; 50). He further defines sensation when he writes, "sensation is indeed the direct connection between consciousness and the external world; it is the transformation of the energy of external excitation into a state of consciousness" (1927, p. 44).

Lenin believed that the primacy of matter could not be denied. Man in his every day experiences finds that matter is primary. Thus, he believed that man recognizes that "our sensation, our consciousness is only an image of the external world, and it is obvious that an image cannot exist without the thing imaged, and that the latter exists independently of that which images it" (1927, p. 63). And, Lenin asserted that this belief of mankind was "the foundation of its (Materialist) theory of knowledge" (1927, p. 63).

In Anti-Duhring, Engels asked the question, "Is man capable of cognition of the real world?" Is the "thing-in-itself" the "thing-for-us?" (see Lenin, 1927, p. 96). Lenin's answer to this question was unequivocally, "Yes." He gives the example of a scientific discovery. If man has studied coal tar and has been using coal tar for years, and suddenly man discovers today that coal tar contains alizarin, does this mean that coal tar did not contain alizarin yesterday? Lenin answers, "of course not" (see discussion, 1927, p. 99). Scientific discoveries do not refute the theory of knowledge of dialectical materialism but rather they are a corroboration of it (Hogan, 1967, p. 303). From this example, Lenin develops his three epistemological conclusions:

> (1) Things exist independently of our consciousness, independently of our perceptions, outside....
>
> (2) There is definitely no difference in principle between the phenomenon and the thing-in-itself, and there can be no such difference. The only

difference is between what is known and what is not yet known....

(3) In the theory of knowledge, as in every other branch of science, we must think dialectically, that is, we must not regard our knowledge as ready-made and unalterable, but must determine how knowledge emerges from ignorance, how incomplete, inexact knowledge becomes more complete and more exact. (Lenin, 1927, p. 99; numbers are mine)

Thus objective reality is the source of our perceptions (Lenin, 1927, pp. 125-126). "We recognize objective reality which is given us in experience, because we recognize an objective source of our sensations independent of man" (Lenin, 1927, p. 126). But the question must be asked does order exist in nature (objective reality), and in turn, man then perceives it, or does man impose order on nature? Lenin writes: "The world is matter moving in conformity to law, and our knowledge, being the highest product of nature, is in a position only to reflect this conformity to law" (1927, p. 170). There is then a "unity of the world" because of this relational materiality (see Lenin, 1927, p. 174). The more man knows about the "unity of the world" the more ordered it seems. Lenin writes: "There is an objective reality that corresponds to the teachings of science (although it is relative at every stage in the development of science...) that the earth existed prior to any society, prior to man, prior to organic matter, and that it has existed for a definite time and in a definite space in relation to other space" (1927, p. 189). He uses the "concepts" of space and time to illustrate his point. He writes: "The basic forms of all being are space and time, and existence out of time is just as gross an absurdity as existence out of space" (1927, p. 178). He then shows the dialectical process in man's awareness of space and time. He writes: "... our 'experience' and our perceptions adapt themselves more and more to objective space and time and reflect them ever more correctly and

profoundly" (1927, p. 189). The objective reality is a world of a priori truths (Lenin, 1927, pp. 159-160).

The question must then be asked, "May man know truth?" Lenin answers, "There is a truth, and we can know it through experience" (1927, p. 126). "The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory, but is a practical question. In practice man must prove the truth...." (1927, pp. 100-111). Yet man may have a false idea of truth. "The cognitive 'reflection' is true if it faithfully represents material reality; otherwise it is false" (Blakeley, 1966, p. 187). Reflection is a process, and repetition is the key to this process. Complexities are often not fully understood until repeated experiences shed light on the object. Thus, one has the classic scientific discovery. For example, Edward Jenner observed milk maids failing to fall prey to smallpox for years. Finally one day, he related their exposure to cow pox germs to their immunity to small pox. Thus the smallpox vaccination was developed. In addition to the need for repeated experiences, man also has difficulty in conveying his internal images to other men. "The fact that the 'second signal system' is in only indirect (through the word) contact with the material object makes error possible" (Blakeley, 1966, p. 187). In addition to this Aristotelian conception of truth, Lenin added a Hegelian notion of truth. Truth is "a process, which is dynamically continuous and cumulative" (Blakeley, 1966, p. 187). "And since the material universe is infinite in extent and duration, truth as a process is a never-ending accumulation which tends toward an ideal limit, called 'absolute truth'; and the truths accumulated along the way are called 'relative truths'" (Blakeley, 1966, p. 187).

According to Lenin, there is an absolute truth, and man is capable of knowing it. He writes, "Human thought then by its nature is capable of giving,

and does give, absolute truth, which is compounded of a sum-total of relative truths" (1927, p. 133). "The limits of approximation of our knowledge to the objective, absolute truth are historically conditional, but the existence of such truth is unconditional, and the fact that we are approaching nearer to it is also unconditional" (Lenin, 1927, p. 134). Thus man's knowledge "advances by degree of disclosure rather than by accumulation of fixed, absolute truths" (Hogan, 1967, p. 302). Lenin uses the word "reflection" as a "relative reflection" rather than as an "absolute reflection", for he believed that man's attainment of knowledge is a dialectical process.

Lenin emphasized the criterion of practice in his theory of knowledge. He wrote:

> The standpoint of life, of practice, should be first and fundamental in the theory of knowledge.... Of course, we must not forget that the criterion of practice can never, in the nature of things, either confirm or refute any human idea completely. This criterion also is sufficiently 'indefinite' not to allow human knowledge to become 'absolute', ... If what our practice confirms is the sole, ultimate and objective truth, then from this must follow the recognition that the only path to this truth is the path of science, which holds the materialist point of view. (1927, p. 142)

Here again Lenin has emphasized the dialectical process in the attainment of knowledge.

In recapitulation, man attains knowledge (truths) through repeated encounters (experiences, practice) with nature (matter). Matter is primary, and sensations, thought, and consciousness are products (secondary products) of matter.

If man's knowledge is determined by nature (matter), then it must be asked, is there any freedom for man in the materialist theory of knowledge? Engels first

addressed this question. He wrote that, "Hegel was the first to state correctly the realtion between freedom and necessity. To him, freedom is the appreciation of necessity" (quoted in Lenin, 1927, p. 189). Freedom then is realizing the necessity of following the laws of matter. Marx believed that in a capitalist society based on private property and the division of labor, man becomes alienated, i.e., there is a discrepancy between the essence and the existence of man (see De George, 1964, p. 268). The essence of man is collective, for he is a social animal. The essence is something he makes in conjunction with other men; it is something that the society shares as a whole. But in the capitalist society, man is separated from other men, from his work, and thus, from himself. Therefore, a man separated from his creative, collective being has only a microscopic part of his essence (see De George, 1964, pp. 268-269). Thus men in the capitalist society become "partial men" or "truncated persons" (De George, 1964, p. 269). Man, according to Marx, can overcome his alienation only by rejecting private property and the division of labor. Only then will man become whole again, realizing his essence through collective, creative being (see De George, 1964, p. 269). Therefore according to Lenin, freedom is attained when man realizes the need for obeying the laws of nature, i.e., for attaining his essence (1927, pp. 189-192). He explains, "Freedom does not consist in the dream of independence of natural laws, but in the knowledge of these laws, and in the possibility this gives of systematically making them work towards definite ends" (1927, p. 189). In this way, Lenin believed that man could become "the lords of nature" (1927, p. 191). This would only happen when man recognized the laws of nature, rejected oppressive systems, and then developed a collective essence. For Lenin, this vindicated the theory of

reflection and thus the materialist epistemology. He wrote: "The mastery of nature manifested in human practice is a result of an objectively correct reflection within the human head of the phenomena and processes of nature, and is proof of the fact that this reflection (within the limits of what is revealed by practice) is objective, absolute and eternal truth" (1927, p. 192).

However, Lenin was troubled by the determinism found in his materialist epistemology. He realized as have others that the theory of reflection is a passivist theory of knowledge and that virtually it combats any activist approach as a philosophical enemy (see Kovaly, 1971, p. 280). He attempted to resurrect subjectivity in man in his Philosophical Notebooks by merging Hegelian logic with materialist epistemology (see Ballestrem, 1965; Hogan, 1967). Ballestrem succinctly explains Hegelian philosophy:

> Hegel's philosophy is a dialectical monism. 'Dialectical' means above all--in Hegel's system--a relationistic and evolutionary view of reality. Relationistic--because reality is not constituted by substances and their properties and relations, but every thing is constituted by 'other', is the result of 'dialectical negations' of itself by all others, is the result of relations. Evolutionary--because reality is not conceived as a static structure, in a once-and-for-all given order, but as being in permanent evolution, through 'dialectical negation' and negations of negations. (1965, p.139)

According to Ballestrem, "Hegel's dialectical explanation of knowledge can be seen in his view that individual knowledge (knowledge by an individual) is an inferior type of knowledge, that the real subject of knowledge is mankind, which develops in its history to ever greater being and knowledge, through different stages of relative truth towards absolute truth" (1965, p. 140).

Lenin retains his definition of knowledge as developed in Materialism and Empirio-criticism. But he adds a subjective twist to the theory of reflection in his hopes to reconcile passive determinism and activism. First, he writes: "Knowledge is the reflection of nature by man. But this is not a simple, not an immediate, not a complete reflection, but the process of a series of abstractions, the formation and development of concepts, laws, etc. and these concepts, laws, etc. (thought, science = 'the logical Idea') embrace conditionally, approximately, the universal law-governed character of eternally moving and developing nature" (1961, p. 182). Yet, he then introduces the subjective element in this process. He writes:

> The laws of the external world, of nature, which are divided into mechanical and chemical...are the bases of man's purposive activity....In his practical activity, man is confronted with the objective world, is dependent on it, and determines his activity by it.... Two forms of this objective process: nature...and the purposive activity of man....Human consciousness, science ...reflects the essence, the substance of nature, but at the same time this consciousness is something external to nature (not immediately, not simply, coinciding with it). (1961, pp. 187-188)

Lenin asserts that there is a subjective consciousness but that it is submerged in the objective world (1961, p. 204). He writes, "Human concepts are subjective in their abstractness, separateness, but objective as a whole, in the process, in the sum-total, in the tendency, in the source" (1961, p. 208). Man then is capable of subjective thought; however, man has been determined by his society, by his collective existence, by matter; and consequently, when one looks at the unity of things, one must describe it as an objective process.

According to Lenin, "The idea (knowledge) is...a process" (1961, p. 200). "The idea (knowledge) is 'truth'....The idea, i.e., truth as a process--for truth is a process--

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passes in its development...through three stages: 1)life; 2) the process of knowledge, which includes human practice and technique...; 3) the stage of the absolute idea (i.e., of complete truth) (Lenin, 1961, p. 201). He then goes on to explain that "Life gives rise to the brain. Nature is reflected in the human brain. By checking and applying the correctness of these reflections in his practice and technique, man arrives at objective truth" (1961, p. 201). Here man appears as an active, subjective creature through the use of such words as "technique," "checking and applying," and "arrives at." Man is subjectively participating in the knowledge process.

Lenin further activizes the cognition process by what has become known as the seeds of dialectical reflection theory. He wrote:

> Cognition is the eternal, endless approximation of thought to the object. The reflection of nature in man's thought must be understood not 'lifelessly,' not 'abstractly,' not devoid of movement, not without contradictions, but in the eternal process of movement, the arising of contradictions and their solutions. (1961, p. 195)

He warns, however, that man has great difficulty entertaining this interconnectedness, this unity of the world. For man attempts to grasp the whole by merely examining a minute part. He writes that:

> We cannot imagine, express, measure, depict movement, without interrupting continuity, without simplifying, coarsening, dismembering, strangling that which is living. The representation of movement by means of thought always makes coarse, kills,--and not only by means of thought, but also by sense-perception, and not only of movement, but every concept. And in that lies the essence of dialectics. And precisely this essence is expressed by the formula: the unity, identity of opposites. (1961, pp. 259-260)

Similarly, he suggests that human concepts must be realized by man for their own interconnectedness, for human concepts reflect the interconnectedness of the material world (the objective reality) (see Lenin, 1961, p. 146). He concludes, "The dialectics of things produces the dialectics of ideas...." (1961, p. 196).

Perhaps through this discussion of the difficulties in realizing the objective process, Lenin is acknowledging the difficulties in understanding how the subjective man has a place in this objective process. However, it is through these attempts of combining subjective man with the objective process of knowledge attainment that Lenin is able to develop his activist creed.

Lenin asserts that, "Man's consciousness not only reflects the objective world, but creates it" (1961, p. 212). He explains:

> The notion (=man), as subjective, again presupposes an otherness which is in itself (=nature independent of man). This notion (=man) is the impulse to realise itself, to give itself objectivity in the objective world through itself, and to realise (fulfil) itself. In the theoretical idea...the subjective notion (cognition?), as the universal and in and for itself indeterminate, stands opposed to the objective world, from which it obtains determinate content and fulfilment. (1961, p. 212; irregularities in spelling of translation)

He defends his position by suggesting that Marx sided with Hegel on this question and that Marx believed that the criterion of practice should be introduced into the theory of knowledge (see Lenin, 1961, p. 212).

Lenin believed that if the world did not suit man, if it did not satisfy him, man would decide to change it through his own activity (see Lenin, 1961, p. 213). He writes:

> The activity of man, who has constructed an objective picture of the world for himself, changes external actuality, abolishes its determinateness

(=alters some sides or other, qualities, of it), and thus removes from it the features of Semblance, externality and nullity, and makes it as being in and for itself (=objectively true). (1961, p. 218).

Lenin went so far as to extol this possible activism in man. He writes, Practice is higher than (theoretical) knowledge, for it has not only the dignity of universality, but also of immediate actuality" (1961, p. 213). Here he appears to be taking a stab at those who supported passivism in the revolution and in the governance of the Soviet state. He warns those who support activism, however, that it is a rough road to hoe. He writes, "The 'objective world' 'pursues its own course,' and man's practice, confronted by this objective world, encounters 'obstacles in the realisation' of the End, even 'impossibility!...'" (1961, p. 214; irregularities in the spelling of the translation).

In recapitulation, Lenin in his Philosophical Notebooks attempts to combine materialist epistemology with Hegelian logic in order to subjectivize man. Man is seen as an active, subjective being who is practicing in an objective world. Man is a part of the material world; however, man can actively change the external actuality of that world.

In addition to attempting to develop an activist approach to materialist epistemology in his Philosophical Notebooks, Lenin sought to develop an ideology of organizational activity (see Wolfenstein, 1967, p. 177). Wolfenstein (1967) uses the phrase "ideology of organizational activity" in describing Lenin's development of the Communist Party. However, here it is used to mean the creed of controlled, directed, and channeled activism. It is the contention of this paper, that Lenin's activist creed is apparent in not only his development of the party but also in his day-to-day domestic and foreign policy considerations. Yes, Lenin believed in the desirability of individual activism, but he wished it to be organized and overseen. Thus it becomes collective activism.

Chronologically speaking, it is necessary to examine the activist creed in Lenin's concept of the party before considering the activist creed in his governance of the Soviet state. "Orthodox Marxist doctrine held that as capitalism progresses, the working class will organize spontaneously, and the workers will acquire the class viewpoint--that is, they will realize the necessity and inevitability of putting an end to capitalism" (Ulam, 1974, p. 20). Many orthodox marxists believed that the place of the party was in the economic realm. The party should fight for the material interests of the workers (see Ulam, 1974, p. 24). However, Lenin saw the party's role in a more activist light. Spontaneity was rejected for consciousness. He believed that spontaneously the workers would develop only trade union consciousness. Therefore, it was the task of the party to instill revolutionary consciousness into the masses (Ulam, 1974, p. 23). He wrote that the "principal and fundamental task is to facilitate the political development and the political organization of the working class" (1961, Vol. IV, p. 369). In "What is to be done?", Lenin discussed the need for an activist party organization. He saw the party as a "quasi-religious order of conspirators devoted to revolution" (Ulam, 1974, p. 23) in that he saw the need for "an organizational weapon, a band of brothers having perseverance, discipline, firmness, implacability and unity of will" (Lenin, 1961b, p. 378). He developed a centralized hierarchical, conspiratorial organization; however, according to Wolfenstein, "he did not trust even those who were the members of the vanguard, hence he tried to build an organization of rules rather than men. The rules would control the behavior of others, and he would control the rules" (1967, p. 313).

Lenin saw the party as "the vanguard of the working class and as such it cannot [could not] be content just to express and execute what the masses want: It's offical aim is [was] to propel them to what they 'really' want (i.e., what they ought to want) and as such it is the teacher and censor of the people"

(Ulam, 1974, p. 91). In theory, every party member is an activist. He is "a man who takes a leading part in public activities of his city, town, or village; who on any job is an example to his fellow workers in industry and diligence; who has at least a rudimentary knowledge of Marxism.... The Bolshevik is then, expected to be a superior citizen, if not a superior type of human being" (Ulam, 1974, pp. 91-92). Thus "a Communist has no right to be an onlooker" (Ulam, 1974, p. 98).

Thus for Lenin, the party should take a leading role in social change. The party should actively seek to change the external actuality. This view is also apparent in Lenin's domestic and foreign policy positions.

Marx and Engels wrote about capitalism, its eventual demise, and the succession of socialism. "There is very little in Marx to indicate concrete steps that a socialist party should undertake upon seizing power in a predominately agricultural country" (Ulam, 1974, p. 36). There is no discussion on how the new socialist country should industrialize and collectivize its farm lands. Many Soviet thinkers believed the economic stages should be allowed to run their course (see Ulam, 1974, pp. 36-37). However, Lenin believed in intervention. During the period known as "War Communism" (1917-1921), the socialists attempted to establish policies that in effect skipped the historical economic periods of Marx. Farm lands were nationalized, and workers received equal pay (in the egalitarian tradition) (see Ulam, 1974, pp. 36-37). However, this failed, and Lenin introduced the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1921. It was the official policy of the Soviet state through 1928. NEP was an attempt to achieve progress towards their social goals but at a more comfortable pace than the pace of the earlier War Communism period. The state nationalized large industry, but it allowed small industry to be free of government control. And the peasants were not expected to pay a set, standard quota but rather a percentage of their crops (see Ulam, 1974, p. 37).

Thus Lenin actively intervened in the historical economic periods of the Soviet state. He sought to speed up the process described by Marx. In another domestic concern, Lenin and his partisans actively intervened. This area was the question of federalism.

Lenin supported the principle that each nation have a free option to remain within the multinational Soviet state (Ulam, 1974, p.69). "The Bolsheviks went out of their way to provoke and establish the feeling of national separateness...." (Ulam, 1974, p. 70). They believed that if the Soviet state removed "national oppression, which is but one form of economic exploitation, and various nationalities will abide peacefully together and, through their free development, will hasten the day when the triumph of socialism will secure one supernational socialist culture and language" (Ulam, 1974, pp. 70-71). Thus Lenin sought to actively change the collective essence of a nationality for the eventual benefit of the Soviet state.

Lenin also believed in actively intervening in foreign proletarian concerns. He believed in actively attempting to change the external actuality of foreign proletariats.

Lenin in Imperialism, the Highest State of Capitalism (1916) sought to bring Marx up to date. He argued that the reason that capitalist societies had failed to fall as Marx had predicted was because the capitalist societies had developed a policy of colonial exploitation. Because of enormous colonially-derived profits, the ruling bourgeoise could afford "to buy off" the proletariat. Revolutionary consciousness on the home front had sagged; however, he argued that the interclass rivalry was merely transplanted into the international scene. In short, Lenin believed that "the main front in the struggle against capitalism was now international" (Schwartz, 1975, p. 101). "The focus of struggle thus shifts from the domestic to the international class struggle, from the proletariat

and the bourgeoisis to 'socialism'...and 'capitalism'" (Schwartz, 1975, p. 101).

With such an idea of an international class conflict, the question then became for Lenin, "how could the Soviet state best fulfill its obligation to its brothers in the world?" Lenin believed in a policy of revolutionary war. He predicted in 1915:

> The victorious proletariat. . . would rise up against the rest of the capitalist world, attracting to itself the oppressed classes of other countries, provoking among them a revolt against the capitalists, appearing if necessary with armed forces against the exploiting classes and states.

(Burin, 1963, p. 337; the victorious proletariat, i.e., the Soviet state) Thus, Lenin believed that Russia should "prepare for the triumph of socialism everywhere by inciting revolutions against the rest of the capitalist world, reinforcing such actions by armed force if necessary" (Schwartz, 1975, p. 105). However, because of domestic chaos in the Soviet state, Lenin saw his first priority as the preservation of the Soviet state (see Schwartz, 1975, pp. 105-107). He chose not to intervene in the Brest-Litovsk crisis in 1918 nor the Hungarian crisis of 1919. He did however, intervene in Poland in 1920; but, the Soviet army was repulsed. Instead of military intervention, Lenin concentrated his activist efforts in organizing a propaganda campaign focused on the European labor movement and in organizing the Third Communist International which was an organization devoted to the mobilization of proletariats everywhere (see Schwartz, 1975, pp. 105-107). Lenin saw himself as not only the head of the first communist state but also as the leader of a world-wide revolutionary movement (Schwartz, 1975, p. 107). Clearly then, Lenin pursued an activist policy in his dealings with foreign affairs.

In conclusion, Lenin attempted to alleviate discrepancies between Marxist philosophy and his own personal activist creed by first, introducing

Hegelian logic into dialectical materialism, and secondly by creating an ideology of organizational activity. However, many philosophers contend there remains a contradiction between determinism and voluntary action (see Ballestrem, 1965, p. 145; Fleischer, 1962, p. 17). Ballestrem observes that Soviet philosophers are far from satisfied with Lenin's attempts to bridge the different perspectives. Ballestrem believes that among Soviet philosophers "a clarification in this confusion is now (being) sought through determining what the relation is between ontology and epistemology, between the laws of thought and the laws of being" (1965, p. 145). Thus the apparent discrepancy is far from solved.

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